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Preface 
 
  My reasons behind writing this paper are very personal and its conclusion will have a 
direct impact on my future. I am Jewish by blood and have always have had a strong connection 
with the tradition even though I do not consider myself religious. I have respected more so the 
traditions and culture that have come from the faith of my mother. The fact that my 
grandfather, great grandfather, and the dozen more before him, carried on these same rituals 
that I carry out on Shabbat or on the high holidays, is beyond the realm of being special. Many 
cannot say that they can share something so similar with their ancestors. It is rare that you have 
an identity as an American outside of sharing your American citizenship with another 310 
million people. Not that I am not proud to be an American, I am very much so, I just have 
always felt however that I was a Jew before an American. There are only around 16 million Jews 
on the planet out of 7 billion people. It’s a very unique identity. Yes, like many others I stand for 
American democracy, the freedom it brings, and its attempt to do the right thing around the 
globe (keyword “attempt”). I would die for my country if necessary but it is not so urgent that I 
come to America’s aid as quickly as possible. Israel is a different story. 
As I write this right now hundreds of rockets and mortars have been raining down upon 
the civilian population of Israel from terrorists in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah waits to the north 
bent also on the destruction of Israel. Their benefactor Iran wishes for the Jewish state to be 
wiped off the face of the earth. It is not such a friendly place for Israel to be located. But it is 
there and it’s not going anywhere. I will never forget something one of uncles said to me this 
summer when I was in Israel serving in an international volunteer Israeli Defense Forces 
program, Sar-El. He said “my grandfather told my father when he was a boy that he was going 
off to war so that he would never have too in the future. My father said the same thing to me in 
yet I still had to fight. I told my kids that, but I know they will still have to serve and risk their 
lives and there isn’t much hope that their kids will not have the same fate.”  I looked at his 
young kids, my other cousins, playing in the yard and couldn’t imagine saying that to my kids or 
anyone in my family. There is something that is deeply wrong when everyone has serve in the 
military because the defense of the country demands it. It’s not like Switzerland where they 
never have to actually spill blood to protect their way of life. I felt like it was my obligation to 
protect something that is in my heart and soul permanently in order to try to make it so that 
the next generation doesn’t have to serve to risk their lives. I wanted to make that sacrifice so 
that they don’t have to just because of the location of their home or what name they call G-d. I 
would think that anyone who was human would think that that is wrong in the world we live in 
today. Just as its wrong that Palestinians care under occupation in West Bank, essentially in a 
big prison.  Many evil men have tried to exterminate the entire Jewish population throughout 
their 3500 year history and to think that there are still many men who wish to still do the same 
is unacceptable. Leaving out the politics of the situation in Israel and just focusing on the 
principle is very important. I have a strong sense of honesty and morality which is why the 
answer to this paper is vital to my decision of serving in the IDF after I graduate in May. I want 
to be a part of something that is noble and just. Protecting those who can’t protect themselves 
is a call to service and I hear that call to defend those that share my identity. No decision is 
emanate or final. This paper will examine modern history with an emphasis on the IDF’s 
cooperation with the noble principles of International Humanitarian Law and will attempt to 
answer the question of how they conduct the defense of Israel against an enemy who hides 
among its own population, essentially holding them hostage. I do not agree with Israel’s 
occupation of the West Bank and do believe the Palestinian people should have the right for 
true self-determination. The issue is complex but the fact of the matter is clear to me, no child 
born into any society should be condemned to serve in the military in order for his existence to 
continue. I want to do my part to ensure that my cousin doesn’t have to pick up a weapon to 
defend himself and his family. Israelis and Palestinians deserve that chance to be born into a 
world without being threatened, just like every American gets that opportunity.  
 The IDF has had a difficult mission to accomplish in their last two conflicts. Dealing with 
a much stronger force than expected in 2006, that force being Iranian trained, funded, and 
armed Hezbollah, hidden amongst the population of southern Lebanon. In December of 2008 
increased rocket fire at the Israeli civilian population from within the sixth most densely 
populated place on earth was at the hands of Hamas. Both groups are political and social 
organizations in addition to their militant arm. The fighting environments were very difficult 
and the IDF walked a thin line distinguishing the combatants amongst the bystanders. The IDF 
made major mistakes that cost lives in both conflicts. However, at the same time, they went to 
extraordinary efforts to ensure that civilians weren’t harmed. This is an assessment of those 
conflicts and how they should be looked at.  War is chaos and we are all geniuses after the fact. 
This paper will attempt to properly identify the relationship the Israeli Defense Forces’ and 
International Humanitarian Law had during the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and Operation 
Cast Lead in Gaza in the winter of 2008-2009.  
                                                                                                                         Skyler Scoggan 
                                                                                                                               21 November 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I: Introduction 
       “To defend the existence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the state of Israel. 
To protect the inhabitants of Israel and to combat all forms of terrorism which threaten 
the daily life1.” 
Mission of the Israeli Defense Forces 
 
 Jewish immigrants seeking refuge from Europe during their Alyiah2 could not have 
established their state in a more dangerous location. In the 64 year history of Israel there were 
many times where its destruction seemed imminent and its sustainability difficult to foresee 
continuing under such circumstances. But each time the people of Israel stood strong against the 
forces that wished for their permanent exit from the holy land and the Jews continued to do what 
they had done for the better part of their 3500 year existence, they survived. Controversy has 
always surrounded the Israeli Defense Forces (hereafter IDF) when concerning human rights and 
the circumstances under which they defend the state of Israel. Since the end of the Yom Kippur 
War in 1973, the IDF has been the most dominant army in the Middle East, which has allowed 
the world to view their opponents as the victim being aggressed against. This paper will weigh 
the IDF’s conduct during two recent conflicts, the 2006 Second Lebanon War and Operation 
Cast Lead3 in Gaza in the winter of 2008-2009, and will compare the facts which will determine 
if the IDF did enough to prevent civilian casualties (compliance with IHL) and were legally 
correct in using force to protect Israel. Comments and reports will be cited from different and 
credible angles of the conflicts with ones that are predominantly accepted by the international 
community. Both of the conflicts have been judged harshly based on the perceptions of the 
media, who occasionally distort the facts and have an agenda of their own. An unbiased 
                                                          
1
 IDF doctrine on IDF official webstie.  See htp://www.idf.il/1497-en/Dover.aspx 
2 Aliya is the immigration of Jews to the land of Israel and is a base principle of Zionism. The first large wave of 
Jewish immigrants coming to Israel began in 1882. 
3
 Also known as the Gaza War. 
approach will be put forth with the right tools necessary to make an accurate assessment of the 
conflicts and their contexts. 
 
II: A Threatening Neighborhood 
  During the 1948 War of Independence the Jews were able to protect themselves 
adequately and collectively for the first time since the destruction of the Second Temple by the 
Romans in 70 CE. The primary reason that Israel has been able to survive in a neighborhood of 
enemies for so long is because of the ability and strength of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), 
along with the morale strength of Israeli society that it instills. The IDF, whose origins come 
from the early militias before the state was officially born (such as the Hagganah, Palmach, and 
Irgun), are one of the most experienced and decorated military force in the history of warfare. 
Having astonished observers with their resilience and speed. Due to their environment everyone 
in Israel is conscripted to serve in the military so that maximum man power is utilize for the 
defense of the country4. 
 At some point in their brief history they have taken on the military forces of Syria, 
Jordon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Cuba, and North 
Korea5, all with the vicious intent of not just defeating the Israelis, but wiping the country off  
                                                          
4
 Males must serve 3 years while females serve 1 ½ years. 
5
 Most of the Arab countries outside of bordering Israel sent forces and supplies to fight in the 1948-49 War of 
Independence, 1967 Six Day War, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. A little known fact is that Cuba and North Korea 
also participated in both wars, mostly showing solidarity in their alliances with the Arab states. Cuba sent 1,500-
4,000 military personal including 500 tank commanders who did see significant action alongside the Syrians during 
the war. North Korea sent an air battalion to Egypt. See John Hoyt Williams article Cuba: Havana’s Military Regime. 
The Atlantic. August 1988. www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1988/08/cuba-havanas-military-
machine/305932/. See George Jochnowitz’s article North Korea’s Enemy: Israel. 
www.jochnowitz.net/Essays/NorthKorea.html. 
the face of the Earth. The 1973 Yom Kippur War was the last non-asymmetrical6 war that Israel 
fought in terms of the use of conventional means against another equally strong military force. 
Starting with the 1982 First Lebanon War the enemy became harder to identify and fought with 
guerrilla style tactics against a much more advanced and dominant military force. As seen in the 
American War in Vietnam, the enemy could blend in with the civilian population and make 
small, but effective strikes on a vastly superior military force. As the enemies of Israel turned 
mostly into non-state actors who targeted the civilian population in order to spread fear, the 
structure of the way the IDF functions had to adapt to their new threats. International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) has played an important role in the way the IDF conducts their current 
and future operations. This paper will address the current and past relationship between IHL and 
the IDF in recent operations, primarily focusing on two conflicts that Israel has been involved in 
since the beginning of the 21st century.. In both of these conflicts Israel has had to fight those 
engaging in asymmetric warfare7 which makes eliminating one’s enemy a more difficult task 
with the fallout of major collateral damage and unintended civilian casualties. In each of these 
armed conflicts you had a different asymmetrical environment to deal with. In 2006 you had a 
surprisingly conventional war against Hezbollah in Lebanon whom showed the capability to 
fight the IDF with deadly effect, due to the latest in weapons technology from Iran. With 
Operation Cast Lead the IDF had to deal with targeting rocket launching sites and Islamic 
militants in one of the most densely populated areas on Earth. In a response to daily rocket and 
mortar attacks on the Israeli civilian population in Southern Israel, by the governing and militant 
body Hamas, the IDF launched a major military operation to rid Palestinian combatants of their 
                                                          
6
 Asymmetric warfare is “leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against the vulnerabilities of a superior 
opponent to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining the opponent’s will in order to achieve 
the asymmetric actors strategic objectives.” Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., The Rise of Asymmetric Threats: Priorities for 
Defense Planning, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW. 75,76 (2001). 
7
 Id 
offensive capabilities using rockets and mortars. The IDF in “Operation Cast Lead” was 
controversial with its compliance with IHL, notably within the principles and laws of jus in 
bello8, jus ad bello, and jus contra bellum. I will also point out the roles of these IHL principles 
during the Second Intifada and the Second Lebanon War. Studying the role of the IDF 
attempting to comply with IHL is the key objective of this paper and an answer to the final 
question: Has and have the Israeli Defense Forces been a major human rights violator that 
neglects IHL or do they and have they, put in the best effort to ensure that innocent civilians are 
not harmed, their property not damaged, and their human rights recognized. While dealing with 
this topic due to the flared intensity on both sides of the issue I will present a centre opinioned 
paper without bias to the best of my abilities. As the conflicts continues in Israel and the 
occupied territories along with the surrounding region, the relationship between the IDF and IHL 
is a constantly adapting one that has major consequences for the entire population of the region.  
III: Trouble to the North 
 
“The strong do as they can, and the weak suffer as they must.” 
                                                                                Thucydides 
Bad blood between Israel and groups in Lebanon goes back to the fallout of Black 
September in Jordon in 1970 when King Hussien moved to expel Palestinian militants from his 
country who attempted to overthrow him9. The broken Palestinian Liberation movement fled into 
Southern Lebanon which would lead to a festering problem for the region for the next three 
                                                          
8
 USLEGAL.COM, Latin for “the law of waging war,” Legal definition: an aspect of international law of war which 
addresses the practices forbidden to belligerents during a war. Defines standards by which a country can conduct 
war and the actions during the war should be just and fair. 
9
 See film PLO: The History of a Revolution-Black September. Aired by Al-Jezzera, 20 July 2009. 
www.aljazeera.com/programmes/plohistoryofrevolution/2009/07/200971385345398771.html 
decades.10  The first conflict in Lebanon when Israel unilaterally used military action was 
following the 1978 Coastal Road Massacre11 and the subsequent Operation Litani three days 
later. Prime Minister Menachum Begin responded with a major military operation involving 
25,000 IDF personnel aimed at crippling the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) and 
other terror networks ability to launch attacks out of Southern Lebanon.12The operation failed to 
drive the PLO fully out and Israel began dangerously investing itself into the Lebanese Civil War 
(1975-1990) by aligning itself with Christian Lebanese Maronite militias13. The political 
establishment in Israel wanted to create a “Red Line” buffer zone in Southern Lebanon to defend 
from future attacks into Northern Israel.14 The Israelis attempted to use the Maronite dominated 
Lebanese Front (LF) as a proxy to fight both the PLO and the primarily Muslim Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM) in the ongoing sectarian Civil War in order to ensure that any new 
Lebanese leadership in Beirut would be Israeli friendly.15 The war would prove to be messy for 
all Western parties involved. On 3 June 1982 an assassination attempt was made on Shlomo 
Argov, the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom’s life with the operation being carried out 
by members of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (PNLM), who were in hiding in 
                                                          
10
 Conflicts as a result of Palestinian militants fleeing from Jordon and the West Bank include: Various terrorist 
attacks on Israel, Syrian Invasion and occupation, 1978 Coastal Road Massacre and subsequent major military 
offensive launched in response (Operation Litani), Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), Israeli invasion and occupation 
of Southern Lebanon aka First Lebanon War(1982-2000), the creation  of Hezbollah in 1985, skirmishes between 
Hezbollah and the IDF (2000-present), Second Lebanon War in 2006.+ 
11
 The Coastal Road Massacre was an operation carried out by 12 members of the Palestinian organization, Fatah, 
hijacked a bus of vacationing civilians and in between shooting at random cars and killing hostages, lead to the 
deaths of 38 Israelis along with 71 wounded. 10 out of the 12 attackers were killed by Israeli security forces which 
halted the slaughter. Still regarded as the ‘worst terrorist attack in Israeli history.’ See 
http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=150852 
12
 http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3686831,00.html 
13
 Maronites are a Christian sect that resides predominantly in Lebanon and Syria. The leadership of the Maronite 
militias supported the Lebanese Front (LF)  
14
 The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFL) also intervened to monitor the border. The mission started 
on 23 March 1978 and continues to this day. 
15
 For overview of Lebanse Civil War see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon.htm,  
Lebanon16. It was the last straw for Begin who said: “This is the moment in which courageous 
choice has to be made. The criminal terrorists and the world must know that the Jewish people 
have a right to self-defense, just like any other people.17"  
Similar to the actions four years prior during Operation Litani, Begin ordered another  
invasion to cleanse the PLO from Lebanon. On 6 June 1982, 80,000 IDF troops executed 
Operation Peace for the Galilee and advanced rapidly to the outskirts of the capital Beirut by the 
seventh day of the invasion, mostly eliminating the PLO quasi-government’s infrastructure and 
weapon capabilities in Lebanon.18 The IDF came upon a situation that would be the prequel to 
their compliance with IHL for the rest of the 20th century and 21st century. One of the main 
objectives was a pocket of heavily armed PLO fighters embedded with a large civilian 
population in the Rashidiyeh refugee camp south of the coastal city of Tyre. For nine days the 
IDF conducted artillery and air attacks on the camp to soften up the PLO fighters who hid among 
the civilian refugee population. The IDF used loudspeakers and leaflets to call upon civilians to 
leave the area, a method used in the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead. The 
estimated casualties of the battle for the Palestinian refugees range close to nearly 6,000, with the 
Israelis suffering around 800 dead and wounded.19 The cost of life on both sides stunned Prime 
Minister Begin and the rest of the Israeli political establishment. The war drew out and the IDF 
began a two month siege of the capital city of Beirut that would draw international condemnation 
as the IDF pounded the city with artillery, naval bombardments, and, air strikes. A large force of 
PLO fighters alongside Syrian regular troops embedded themselves with the civilian population, 
                                                          
16
 Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our time, second edition,Page 903-904 (Alfred 
A. Knopf Inc. 1996) 
 
17
 From Avi Shlaim’s The Iron Wall, p. 404-405 
18
 SACHAR, supra note 15. P. 906 
19
 id p. 908 
but the IDF was reluctant to take the fighting to the streets of West Beirut for they knew their 
own losses would be too high for the standards of the Israeli public. According to Lebanese 
sources over 17,825 civilians died along with 30,000 wounded during the 88 day siege20.  
The IDF mostly failed in their obligation to Customary International Humanitarian Law 
with the “distinction of civilian objects and military objectives”, during their bombardment of 
Beirut. However, the contradicting factor of the non-state actor of which being the PLO and the 
state actor being Syrian Army regulars, whom were being engaged by the IDF  in West Beirut 
during the siege, violated Article 13 of the 1956 New Delhi Draft Rules which provides “parties 
to the conflict are prohibited from placing or keeping members of the civilian population subject 
to their authority in or near military objectives, with the idea of inducing the enemy to refrain 
from attacking those objectives21.” This put the IDF in a very difficult situation in weighing the 
collateral damage of civilian property and life, and attacks of military necessity needed to end the 
conflict. Israel’s Manual on the Laws of War states that “legal combatants are “soldiers serving 
in the army (regular or reserve) or in a well ordered militia forces (e.g. the SLA or State National 
Guard in the United States)22.”   The preview of asymmetrical warfare opened the door for 
decades of controversial operations by the IDF as they attempted to stay within the bounds of 
IHL while fighting a cheap enemy that targeted civilians. The IDF’s humanitarian credibility and 
their efforts to avoid civilian casualties took a major hit on 12 September 1982 when they 
surrounded the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, where the remaining PLO forces were 
thought to be hiding23. The IDF dispatched members of the Christian Phalangist militia to clear 
                                                          
20
 Best figure for casualties during the Siege,  see http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-6824.html 
21
 ICRC.org 
22
 From document Customary International Humanitarian Law : Volume II, practice. Article 590 in Distinction 
between Civilians and Combatants, P. 116 
23
 See for full casualty overview  www.massviolence.org/Sabra-and-Chatila?artpage=3  
the village of fighters, over the next two days the militia massacred over 700 Palestinian civilians 
as Israeli military leadership stood by. The First Lebanon War of 1982 is similar to the United 
States’ efforts in Vietnam, for it was drawn out and difficult to engage the enemy without 
causing civilian casualties.  
The political and social environment was incredibly complex which entangled Israel in a 
sectarian clash. The 1982 War in Lebanon would highlight the IDF’s new tactical doctrine 
forming around the principles of distinction and proportionality when engaging in armed conflict 
(both jus in bello and jus ad bello). The IDF succeeded in halting into Israel for a short period, 
but the PLO wasn’t completely destroyed and Israel’s subsequent 18 year occupation of 
Southern Lebanon created a future enemy that would prove very difficult to neutralize, 
Hezbollah. The “First” Lebanon War starting in 1982 pushed the IDF to the limit in attempting 
to destroy an enemy who’s main strategy in order to survive was “hugging24” with the civilian 
population. The IDF limped out of Lebanon with a tattered public image both with the 
international community and within Israel.  
2006 Second Lebanon War 
  “Israel’s final departure from Lebanon is a prelude to the final obliteration from 
existence and the liberation of Jerusalem from the talons of occupation.” “Our struggle 
will only end when this entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease fire, 
and no peace agreements
25
.” 
                                                                                    1985 Hezbollah Manifesto  
 
                                                          
24
 Hugging- Hiding tactics designed to force Israel to abstain from attacking due to fears of collateral casualties. 
Strategies of Hamas and Hezbollah.   From Penny L. Mellies paper Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics. 
Chapter 2, P. 62 
25
Citing open letter from Hezbollah (as cited in Major Jennifer B. Bottoms’s paper When close doesn’t count: an 
analysis of Israel’s jus ad bello and jus in bello in the 2006 Lebanon War. Pg.2 
  
“To the Inhabitants of Lebanon” 
“Due to the terrorist activities carried out by Hezbollah which destroys the effort to find a 
brighter future for Lebanon. The Israelis Army will continue its work within Lebanon as long as 
it deems to fit to protect the citizens of the state of Israel. For your own safety and because we do 
not wish to cause anymore civilian death, you are advised to avoid all places frequented by 
Hezbollah. You should know the continuation of terrorist activities against the state of Israel will 
be considered a double edged sword for you and Lebanon.” The State of Israel26 
              Pamphlet translated from Arabic dropped by the IDF into Lebanese population centers. 
 
On the morning of 12 July 2006 an above average border attack by Hezbollah militants 
on a motorized patrol ended with three IDF soldiers dead and two” kidnapped27” who were taken 
in order to use their bodies to set up a prisoner exchange. A helicopter, a ground unit, and a 
Merkava Mark II tank were ordered over the Lebanese border to attempt to locate the kidnapped 
soldiers. The tank hit a massive anti-tank mine which killed all four of the crew. Another soldier 
was killed attempting to reach those in the knocked out Merkava, bringing the total to eight dead 
and two missing28. Hezbollah crossed an international border and conducted an armed attack 
which is an outright breach of International Law.  Just a few weeks prior, an IDF checkpoint near 
Gaza was attacked by Hamas affiliated militants who kidnapped Gilad Shalit, an IDF corporal, 
making him the first abduction of an IDF soldier since 1994. The border attack ended any 
peaceful solutions for the state of Israel which had observed an ever growingly militarized 
Hezbollah assisted by the regimes of Syria and Iran. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense 
Minister Amir Peretz, and Chief of Staff for the Israeli Defense Forces Lt. General Dan Halutz 
                                                          
26
 Taken from special report from http://www.psywarrior.com/IsraeliLebanon.html 
27
 The two IDF soldiers were actually killed during the ambush and their bodies taken back into Lebanon. The 
remains of the bodies were returned to Israel two years later on 16 July 2008. See Israel’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs article, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon-
+Hizbullah/Hizbullah+attack+in+northern+Israel+and+Israels+response+12-Jul-2006.htm 
28
 From Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 July 2006. 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon-
+Hizbullah/Hizbullah+attack+in+northern+Israel+and+Israels+response+12-Jul-2006.htm 
confided that the seizing of the soldiers was an “act of war29” and ordered a full out offensive 
into Lebanon against Hezbollah to rid the rising threat to Israel. The Israelis blamed the 
government of Lebanon for not asserting its authority over its sovereign territory in the south and 
stated that “responsibility for this belligerent act of war lies with the Government of Lebanon, 
from whose territory these acts have been launched into Israel30.” For the next 34 days the IDF’s 
compliance with International Humanitarian Law would be controversial on the world stage with 
heavy opinions making claims of violstions on both sides. As in most military operations carried 
out by any armed force from any state, the line between legality and recklessness was thin. By 
the end of the conflict the seemingly “invincible” IDF would come out of Lebanon unsure of its 
purpose and justification.  Hezbollah, although damaged significantly, was celebrated in the 
Arab world for inflicting significant casualties on the Israelis. 114 IDF soldiers would be killed 
and the public’s support of the operation expanding deeper into Lebanon was low31. “Israeli 
politicians and planners displayed strategic blindness. While denying the IDF victory, they 
squandered an opportunity to destroy the bulk of Hezbollah’s military presence in southern 
Lebanon, settle regional scores, enhance Israel’s deterrence, and strengthen Jerusalem’s alliance 
with Washington32.”  Israel was condemned by many in the international community who saw an 
overreaction that littered Lebanon’s economy and its people’s way of life. The IDF was ill 
prepared for a war and it would take years to reform the structure so that when tested again, they 
would be fully ready for an effective response. 
                                                          
29
 See Urquhart, Conal (12 July 2006). Israelis invade Lebanon after soldier are seized. The Guardian (London) 
30
 Stated in a letter by the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations. See article Security Council 
calls on all sides in Middle East to cooperate with UN team. UN News Service, 14 July 2006. 
http://electronicintifada.net/content/security-council-calls-all-sides-middle-east-cooperate-un-team/2492 
31
 http://www.ariel-sharon-life-story.com/Ehud_Olmert_2nd_Lebanon_War_2006_Casualties.shtml 
32
 From Efraim Inbar’s article How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War. Middle East Quarterly. Summer 2007. 
Pg. 57-65. 
 IV: Israeli compliance with Article 52 of the Geneva Conventions to warn civilians 
“Both for principled and pragmatic reasons, Israel set certain limits on the conduct of its 
hostilities with Hezbollah. The mission was informed by IDF representatives that Israel 
followed its practice of drawing up lists of potential targets, with each individual target, as well 
as the type of weapon to be used, being reviewed by an IDF expert in humanitarian  
law33.” 
                                        UN Human Rights Council report: Mission to Lebanon & Israel  
                             
This paper will also examine the claim that the IDF believed that it gave full effort to 
comply with Article 57 of the Geneva Conventions which stipulates that the attacker complies 
with the following: 
 “(i) Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians 
nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives within the 
meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this 
Protocol to attack them. 
 “(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a 
view to avoiding, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians 
and damage to civilian objects; 
 “(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated; 
 “(b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is 
not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated; 
 “(c) effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian 
population, unless circumstances do not permit34.” 
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 The IDF seemingly complied with these laws during the Second Lebanon War, 
albeit still in a destructive manner that was disproportionate in response to the border attack. 
However after Hezbollah started firing rockets into Northern Israel indiscriminately it was 
justified in order to protect their population from the major threat. The IDF followed protocol by 
dropping nearly 17,000,000 propaganda leaflets during the conflicts into civilian population 
centers that communicated the mission of the IDF to protect Israel from Hezbollah and, 
statements that communicated for civilians to leave the areas where Hezbollah operatives were 
concentrated. The interpretations of Article 57 when applied to what the IDF did to warn 
civilians of attack and to protect them from unintended harm, seems to be adequately followed 
which justifies their conduct in the campaign that they waged against Hezbollah under IHL and 
Customary International Law.   One leaflet stated the following in Arabic to residents in Beirut: 
“The Israeli army will increase its actions in Lebanon against the continuing 
terrorist actions of Hezbollah to defend the citizens of the state of Israel. For the sake of 
your own safety, and in our wish not to harm any civilians that are not implicated, you 
must keep away from the locations where Hezbollah is present and acting against the 
state of Israel. Including: Locations where missiles are fired in the direction of the state of 
Israel; Locations of Hezbollah's arsenals and military equipment; Hezbollah's centers 
south of Beirut and areas under its control in the south of Lebanon; Beirut's southern 
suburb, the center of terrorism. The Israeli defense army calls on the Lebanese residents 
and Lebanese army to refrain from aiding, either directly or indirectly, elements of 
Hezbollah. Anyone who does will be putting their life in danger. Know that the 
persistence of terrorism against the state of Israel is keeping you from a better future35.”                                                                                                              
The State of Israel 
  
 Targeted phone calls were made with an automated message telling residents to leave the 
area for an attack was imminent.  While doing this is in theory is fully in compliance with IHL, 
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post-war investigations were mixed on the efforts of the IDF. According to the UN Human 
Rights Council report conducted by the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon stated “with regard 
to precautions taken by Israel to minimize civilian casualties, the Commission came to the 
conclusion that IDF did not give effective warning as required under IHL. Where warnings were 
given, they often did not allow sufficient time for the population to leave, and in any event, 
civilians were at risk of being attacked if they did leave and did not have access to safe 
humanitarian exit corridors36.”  
 It is reasonable for the international community to be disturbed by the quantity of 
Lebanese civilians killed, but each state needs to look at the context of what the IDF needed to 
do, what the situation was at the time, and what most states would do to protect their citizens. 
There is a large difference between intentionally targeting civilians and then “unintentionally” 
harming them because they are caught in the collateral damage of a strike. Thomas Hurka argues 
“that a nation, may kill somewhat more enemy civilians if that is unavoidable in saving a smaller 
number of its own [assuming it makes serious efforts to minimize collateral harm]37.” It is unfair 
to suggest that the government of Israel and IDF commanders would choose their own soldiers 
injuries over collateral civilian deaths which is an unintended consequence in the targeting of 
enemy combatants. Commenting on Hurka’s statement, M.L. Gross says “this view [Hurka’s] is 
very attractive because it arithmetically compares the number of enemy civilians an army harms 
to the number of compatriot civilians it hopes to save by military action. It thereby avoids the 
common pitfall of comparing the number of civilians killed on each side and declaring war or 
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engagement disproportionate when the one side kills far more civilians than the other38.” This 
theory would also be applicable in Operation Cast Lead nearly two and a half years later when 
the IDF engaged Hamas in a more densely populated urban environment. While not acceptable 
on the international stage, the legality of unintentionally killing civilians around combatants 
during international armed conflict is justified under IHL if the targeting and killing of those 
enemy fighters offers a clear military advantage. Therefore if the IDF’s intentions were sincere 
to just eliminate Hezbollah fighters to win the conflict, then they were then legally allowed to do 
so in order to protect the citizens of Israel. 
 
 
V: Failures in the conduct of IDF operations 
The IDF conducted immediate airstrikes and used mobile artillery to pound Hezbollah’s 
fortified positions following the events on the northern border. A land, air, and sea blockade of 
Lebanon was executed the next day on 13 July. IDF airstrikes hit Hezbollah infrastructure and 
instillations across the entire country with a shock and awe air campaign. Israel wanted to cripple 
Hezbollah’s ability to communicate and move supplies to the south, with the intention of 
obliterating their institutions. The military had waited for an excuse to launch an offensive aimed 
at completely ensuring that Hezbollah would never poise as a threat to the state of Israel ever 
again.  The Israeli Air Force (IAF) “flew some 15,500 sorties over Lebanon, attacking some 
7,000 ‘targets.’ The Israeli Navy conducted over 2500 bombardments of targets within range of 
the Lebanese coast. The Israeli Army fired tens of thousands of artillery shells and multiple 
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launch rockets39.” By the end of the 34 day conflict it was estimated that the IDF hit 109 bridges, 
445,000 sq. km of roads, 25 fuel stations, 900 commercial enterprises, and about 30,000 
residential properties40. They had also destroyed most of Beirut’s International Airport because 
the IDF stated “[it] had been serving as a way station for the transfer and shipping of weapons 
and infrastructure of the Hezbollah terrorist organization41.” However, the UN Commission of 
Inquiry in Lebanon concluded differently with a report that is controversial among the 
international community due to the fact that the commission was not mandated to report on 
Hezbollah’s violations, only Israel’s. James G. Baker’s summarized legal appraisal on the 
commission stated that the mission’s main points were that the IDF used “an excessive, 
indiscriminate, and disproportionate use of force” and “an overall lack of respect for the cardinal 
principles regulating the conduct of armed conflict. Israeli forces ‘clearly failed to distinguish 
between military and civilian targets’42.” Baker additionally pointed out: 
“On the one hand, the Commission is correct that Hezbollah offices and political 
headquarters are not necessarily military targets-particularly since the organization is also 
responsible for medical facilities, schools, groceries, an orphanage, a garbage service and 
a reconstruction programme for homes damaged during Israel’s invasion. On the other, 
these and other buildings in Southern Lebanon could be legitimate military objectives if 
Hezbollah’s use of them made an ‘effective contribution to military action’ and if their 
destruction would have delivered a ‘direct military advantage.’ Regrettably the 
Commission did not envisage this possible inquiry whether the incidental civilian losses 
were disproportionate to the military advantage gained43.”  
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The Commission also came to the conclusion “that damage inflicted on some 
infrastructure was done for the sake of destruction44.” While a reason could most likely be put 
forth by the Israelis as to how most of the civilian infrastructure destroyed would assist 
Hezbollah moving arms and supplies to the front lines, the damage done to the civilian 
population’s quality of life was disproportionate to what the IDF’s mission of targeting the area 
that was an immediate threat to Israel, Hezbollah’s militarized south45. However at the same time 
any government would mandate its armed forces to protect its population and go to any 
disproportionate means to ensure that casualties on the home front were as low as possible. 
An example that Stewert highlights that is of major concern is when the IDF established a 
free-fire zone south of the Litanti River in which civilians were given a strict curfew and 
restriction applying to their movement in the area, those that remained could be fired upon with 
little justification other than they violated the curfew. This distorts the principle of distinction 
and removes any protection that a civilian has to not be attacked by the IDF. The fact that 
civilians immediately become just military targets because of their location during a certain time 
of day is major violation of the principle of distinction and does not justify the IDF to open fire. 
An unacceptable example of this and violation of IHL was when the IDF entered the village of 
Marjayoun and requested the Lebanese military to full evacuate the village. The United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) escorted a convoy of civilian vehicle out of the city when an 
IDF air strike destroyed a few cars killing six people and wounding 1646. The IDF released a 
statement explaining the justification for attack stating that they “identified suspicious movement 
along a route forbidden for travel which had been used by Hezbollah to transport rockets and 
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other weapons. Acting on a suspicion that these were Hezbollah terrorists transporting weaponry, 
an aerial attack was carried out47.” The nature of the comment “suspicious” is incredibly 
concerning and can be linked with the IDF violating IHL for not fully having factual proof that 
the cars attacked were military objects. These scenarios were prevalent during the majority of the 
conflict which majorly hurt the credibility of Israel’s legal justifications attacking other targets 
that actually were military objects, not just “suspected.” While the majority of the strikes were 
legal under IHL it was incidents like the Marjayoun Convoy attacks that lead to the UN Human 
Rights Council Inquiry to discredit the rest of the IDF’s claims that certain engagements were 
legal.  
The attack on Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport, a mainly civilian installation was 
justified due to long standing intelligence stating that “Beirut's airport has long been a key 
Hezbollah supply line, a gateway for weapons, funding and personnel, mainly from Iran48.” 
Although the claim is broad and is subject to undisclosed intelligence reports, all attacks by the IDF on 
what would be commonly called on as civilian infrastructure, were “dual use” facilities and could be 
classified as military objects. Under IHL those targets hit by the IDF within Lebanon were legal 
due to Article 52 (2) of the Geneva Conventions which states that “those objects which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total 
or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage49.” These strikes on infrastructure only increased as Hezbollah 
launched mid ranged rockets indiscriminately into Israel targeted mostly on the Israeli civilian 
population. 3,970 mostly Iranian made short and medium range rockets were fired into Israel 
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during the 34 day conflict with the overall casualties on the Israeli civilian side numbering in at 
44 dead and nearly 1,000 wounded50. Although Hezbollah was justified to defend themselves in 
response to IDF strikes, even though they sparked the conflict, they "violated the applicable 
principles of humanitarian law, in some cases by targeting the civilian population in northern 
Israel, and in others by disregarding the principle of distinction51."  
The final casualty numbers according to Lebanese authorities for the 34 day conflict were 
1,191 killed and 4,409 injured, including both civilians and Hezbollah fighters52. The final 
figures of what percentage of those killed were enemy combatants and members of Hezbollah 
are factually unknown. As seen in other parts of history, collective punishment, outlawed by 
Article 33 of the IV Geneva Convention53, has been employed by many powerful armies 
including the Germans in WWI against Belgian resistance fighters, the Nazis in WWII in all 
occupied territories, and Saddam Hussein against the Kurds for their opposition to his regime. 
“Of course the IDF carried out collective punishment against the Shi’a population of Southern 
Lebanon for their hosting of Hezbollah, look at what they did on the last days of the war54.” 
During the final 72 hours before a ceasefire was agreed upon, the IDF dropper 90 percent of the 
total amount of cluster munitions used during the war over southern Lebanon55. “The UN Mines 
Action Coordination Center South Lebanon (UNMACC) estimates that one million bomblets 
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remained on the soil after the end of the war56. Since the conclusion of the conflict 26 people 
have been killed and 186 have been injured by left over ordinance57. The Inquiry Commission 
concluded that the use of cluster munitions “were used deliberately to turn large areas of fertile 
agricultural land into ‘no go’ areas for the civilian population. Furthermore, in view of the 
foreseeable high dud rate58, their use amounted to de facto scattering of anti-personnel mines 
across wide tracts of Lebanese land. The presence of unexploded ordinance continues to act a 
major impediment to the return of IDPs and refugees, as well as threatening the lives and 
livelihoods of those who have chosen to return59.” The IDF’s use of cluster munitions during the 
conflict and especially during the final 72 hours does bring up major questions pertaining to 
Israel’s ethical conduct and intentions during the deployment of cluster ordinance.  
 When looking at the IDF’s failures to comply with IHL during the Second 
Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, there are major causes of concern that were identified by 
the UN Human Rights Council report. The conduct of the IDF during the Second Lebanon War 
is looked at from two different contexts and two vastly different intentions; did the IDF 
intentionally follow IHL to best of their ability given the situation and did they make a full effort 
to comply with the principle of distinction while attacking positions where Hezbollah fighters 
were among civilians? Or did the IDF cause unnecessary and deliberate casualties in violation of 
IHL?  Given the facts and the efforts made in the conflict given the circumstances, the Israeli 
Defense Forces cannot be described as not being in compliance with IHL and should be judged 
within the language of M.L. Gross’s article on lessons learned from the Second Lebanon War: 
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“During war, civilians are subject to collateral and direct harm. By law and ethics, the 
principle of proportionality mitigates collateral harm and the principle of noncombatant 
immunity forbids direct harm. Each principle hopes to limit civilian death and injury 
significantly. During asymmetric war between a large and technologically superior state 
army and a small and far less sophisticated nonstate guerrilla organization, two 
phenomena weaken these principles. First, noncombatants are outwardly 
indistinguishable from the guerrillas who operate in their midst. As a result, state armies 
inevitably subject noncombatants to unnecessary and disproportionate harm as they 
attempt to destroy guerrilla forces, Second, state armies are redefining the status of 
civilians who provide war-sustaining aid. By law, civilians who do not directly 
participate in the hostilities retain their immunity despite the essential financial, 
educational, welfare, telecommunications, and legal support they provide a military 
organization60.” 
 Jan-Shai Deniz, a four year veteran and former IDF soldier in the elite special forces 
units, Sayeret Matkal61 and Duvdevan62, stated “I cannot imagine another country doing more” 
to ensure that IHL is complied with63. Deinz also specified that the Geneva Conventions are tied 
into the Laws of War, which is the IDF doctrine that is taught to every member of the military 
and stresses compliance with IHL. The IDF was at the very least, unorganized in its conduct 
during the Second Lebanon War along with being unprepared for a 34 day operation. The lessons 
learned in terms of warning civilians of impending attack would carry over to Operation Cast 
Lead. In the three years between the end of the Lebanon conflict and start Operation Cast Lead, 
the IDF increased funding for training reserve soldiers in order to increase their preparedness 
along with a structurally reform in communication between air support and elements on the 
ground. The better prepared, the better that IHL would be complied in the next conflict. 
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 Operation Cast Lead 
 “In these circumstances, there is no question Israel was legally justified in resorting to the 
use of force against Hamas. As explained above, this resort to force occurred in the context of an 
ongoing armed conflict between a highly organised, well-armed, and determined group of 
terrorists and the state of Israel. The Gaza operation was simply the latest in a series of armed 
confrontations precipitated by the attacks perpetrated without distinction against all Israel 
citizens by Hamas and its terrorist allies (Sassoli, Bouvier and Quintin)64.”  
 
   The Gaza Strip has been a constant place of suffering and oppression since Israel 
acquired it via force from Egypt after the 1967 Six Day War. Decades of living in refugee camps 
fueled anger towards the State of Israel as the Palestinians were denied autonomy time and time 
again. The First Intifada or “uprising” began in 1987 as radical Islam began spreading through 
the Arab world which ultimately led to the creation of the Palestinian political and militant 
organization better known as Hamas65. The organization is an offshoot of the Egyptian political 
group, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), in which Hamas originally was the MB’s Gaza affiliate66. 
Hamas was founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who preached violence and for jihad against 
Israel, including encouraging the employment of suicide bombings as a preferred method of 
terrorism67. Hamas stated in its charter, “Israel will exist and will continue  to  exist  until  Islam  
will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it68.” The First Intifada was mostly rioting by 
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Palestinian youths in the West Bank and Gaza, which went on till the Oslo Accords were signed 
in September of 1993. Hamas mostly remained out of the picture during the uprising except for 
conducting its first suicide bombing five months before the Oslo Agreement69. The Second 
Intifada or Al-Aqsa intifada70 would prove to be psychologically devastating to Israeli society 
and would thin the line between a combatant and noncombatants as the enemy wore no uniform. 
“While the stone and the bottle were the symbols of the First Intifada, in the second uprising they 
were superseded by rifles, pistols, hand grenades, mortars, and suicide bombs71.” From 2000 to 
2007 the Second Intifada was responsible for the deaths of nearly 4,228 Palestinians and 1,024 
Israelis72, with over 151 suicide bombings73 occurring throughout the conflict, with forty percent 
of them being carried out by Hamas74. Hamas and other militant organizations launched nearly 
12,000 rockets and mortars from Gaza towards towns in Southern Israel from 2000 up until the 
beginning of Operation Cast Lead in December of 200875.According to many in the academic 
community, the Intifada continues to the current day.  
In August of 2005 Israel unilaterally withdrew all military personnel and Jewish settlers, 
from the Gaza Strip hoping for a legitimate government to emerge. The Palestinian Authority 
(PA) took control for a brief time which allowed the Palestinian nation-state to be linked with the 
West Bank. Extremists still launched operations out of the enclave into Southern Israel with PA 
security forces too weak and powerless to control the threat. In January of 2006 Hamas won 76 
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seats out of 132 in the Palestinian Parliamentary elections which were judged as being free and 
fair elections by the international community76. After it was decided that Hamas would be the 
majority party in the Palestinian Authority, the United Nations, United States, European Union, 
and Russia cut all funding to the Palestinian government. Hamas made a power move in June 
2007 by engaging in a bloody coup d’état which lead to a brief Palestinian Civil War between 
the Islamists and the PA. The end result would be the complete control of Gaza by Hamas with 
the West Bank governed by the PA, essentially splitting Palestinian society into to two separate 
governing factions. Hamas was engaged in all of Gaza’s political, social, and military levels 
while designating their charter, which calls for the complete destruction of the Jewish state and 
the use of terrorism to achieve that, as their main doctrine for governance. The spokesperson for 
Hamas, Ismail Radwan, called for all Palestinians to “liberate Palestine” by attacking and killing 
Jews rather than engaging in diplomatic efforts77. Following Hamas’s violent takeover of Gaza, 
Israel and Egypt imposed a blockade which would set a limit on the amount of goods and people 
allowed in and out of the territory. The economy and daily life of Gazans has greatly suffered 
under the blockade with the population nearly entirely reliant on Israeli discretion on the terms of 
fuel and goods, including food, which was measured by the calorie being allowed in78. The 
blockade was brutal and lead to increased anger within the Palestinian population, especially 
with the second highest share of people aged 0-14 worldwide along with 51% of the population 
under 1879.  
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Hamas continued to smuggle weapons and rockets in tunnels that went under the 
Egyptian borer which expanded their arsenal many fold.  
 “Not surprisingly, rocket attacks increased considerably following Hamas’ 
assumption of control of Gaza. In 2006, 1,130 missiles were fired from Gaza toward Israel. In 
2007, the year following the Hamas takeover, 2,433 rockets were launched from Gaza, more than 
double the amount the previous year. The trend continued upward in 2008 when Hamas militants 
launched 3,278 rockets into Israel. These attacks did not cease until the “Tahadiya” or “lull 
arrangement” on June 19, 200880.” 
 
. Those six months during the Tahadiya would be the quietest since Hamas took control a 
year before, with 223 rockets and 139 mortars being fired into Israel over that period, a relatively 
low number compared to the months before and after the tahadiya81. On 19 December Hamas 
announced they would not extend the ceasefire and launched an operation on Christmas Eve 
when they renewed firing rockets and mortars into Israel. A collision course was unavoidable as 
“military hostilities were a culmination of the long process of economic and political isolation 
imposed on the Gaza Strip by Israel, which is generally described as a blockade82.” The blockade 
suffocated those in Gaza leading to additional attacks on the borders against IDF forces and 
civilians in nearby villages. “Of course they’re going to fire rockets at the Israelis. They are 
trapped in a prison. There is nothing more for them to lose83.” A major confrontation was 
imminent and it would be a show of force against the Palestinians on a scale never seen before. 
During the disengagement in September of 2005 the last IDF soldier locked the gate vowing 
never to return to Gaza again. Unfortunately within three years, they would have to return due to 
the increase in rocket fire in Southern Israel. “Operation Cast Lead is a reaction to Hamas’s 
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action84.” Under customary international law, a blockade constitutes an act of war and is 
therefore regulated by the law of self-defense85,” which according to some would justify 
Hamas’s armed attacks on IDF personal.  
“Since 2001, armed groups within the Gaza Strip have fired thousands of rockets into 
Israel, conducted suicide bombings, and staged vehicular assaults, killing nearly 1,200 Israeli 
residents and wounding nearly 10,000 more. Indiscriminate rocket attacks are the daily reality of 
over 950,000 Israelis currently living within range of mortar, Qassam rocket, and M-21OF (a.k.a. 
“Grad”) rocket attacks fired from Gaza86.”While the civilian population of Gaza suffered from 
the Israeli blockade, Israeli civilians were being terrorized by indiscriminate rocket attacks being 
fired by militants.  
“After exhausting other alternatives and after issuing warnings that Israel would attack if 
the rocket and mortar assault from Gaza did not stop, the IDF launched a military operation 
against Hamas and other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. The operation was limited to 
what the IDF believed necessary to accomplish its objectives: to stop the bombardment of Israeli 
civilians by destroying and damaging the mortar and rocket launching apparatus and its 
supporting infrastructure, and to improve the safety and security of Southern Israel and its 
residents by reducing the ability of Hamas and other terrorist organizations.87” 
On the morning of 27 December, the IDF launched a massive air campaign backed by 
artillery, pounding positions within Gaza. The first day casualties were astonishing with 221 
Palestinians killed within the first 24 hours of the offensive88.  Within Article 51 of the UN 
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Charter Israel was obligated to their citizens to act legally in the name of inherent self-defense by 
means of armed force. For a week the IDF targeted weapon storage sites, rocket launching 
apparatuses, command and control centers, and individual high ranking officials of Hamas. 
Major collateral damage accompanied the IDF’s destruction of Hamas’s offensive capabilities. 
While the IDF was not prepared for the War in Lebanon they had taken the lessons learned in 
2006 and applied them to the ground force that would invade Gaza on 3 January. The fighting 
would last until 18 January when the IDF would withdraw its forces from Gaza, leaving a 
massive amount of destruction in their wake. Due to the population density the IDF went to great 
measures to warn the civilian population. After the military shortcomings in the IDF, the military 
reverted back to the basics during the operation, albeit in an environment that is guaranteed to 
have major collateral damage to the civilian population. Those fundamentals included 
“audacious combined arms maneuver warfare supported by devastating firepower,” something 
that had been greatly successful in the past for the Israelis89. Because of the overuse of firepower 
in order to protect soldier’s lives, a number of disturbing reports came out of Gaza of incidents 
where IDF soldiers shot and killed Palestinians holding a white flag to surrender. Along with the 
destruction of property due to the commander considering any structure to be a “military 
advantage,” if used by Hamas. There were known human rights violations documented by 
Amnesty International and those involved in the IDF have yet to be convicted of any crime. 
Israel accomplished their mission of halting rocket fire coming from the Gaza Strip but major 
questions would persist on the principles of proportionality and distinction.  
VI: IDF efforts in compliance with IHL during Operation Cast Lead 
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Despite all of this, of course innocent civilians were killed. War is chaos and full of mistakes. There have been 
mistakes by the British, American and other forces in Afghanistan and in Iraq, many of which can be put down to 
human error. But mistakes are not war crimes.  
 
More than anything, the civilian casualties were a consequence of Hamas’ way of fighting. Hamas deliberately tried 
to sacrifice their own civilians. 
Mr. President, Israel had no choice apart from defending its people, to stop Hamas from attacking them 
with rockets. 
 
And I say this again: the IDF did more to safeguard the rights of civilians in a combat zone than any other army in 
the history of warfare90.” 
UN Watch Oral Statement 
Delivered by Colonel Richard Kemp 
UN Human Rights Council 
12th Special Session, 16 October 2009 
Debate on Goldstone Report 
“Hamas strategy was twofold: (1) to take advantage of the sensitivity of the IDF to 
civilian casualties on the Palestinian side, in an attempt to deter the IDF from attacking 
legitimate targets; and (2) where the IDF did attack, to wield an excellent propaganda war 
against Israel, featuring civilian casualties as well as damage to homes and public 
institutions91.”The task at hand for IDF ground forces entering Gaza had “difficulties of both 
interpreting events during asymmetric war and fighting effectively while trying to preserve the 
traditional distinction between combatants and noncombatants92.”The tactics of Hamas who 
placed many rocket launching sites in school yards and next to hospitals forced the IDF to make 
a tough decision on what would classify as a military objective near a civilian structure. “In other 
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words, Hamas chose to base its operations in civilian areas not in spite of, but because of, the 
likelihood of substantial harm to civilians. The IDF could not forgo a legitimate military 
objective without undermining its mission and jeopardizing both its soldiers and Israeli civilians. 
In those circumstances, the result of Hamas’ approach was to make it difficult, and sometimes 
impossible, for IDF forces to avoid harm to civilians and civilian objects93.” 
The IDF knew the risks going into Gaza and that the proximity of civilians and civilian 
objects next to any target was a given. In these following examples the IDF was in full 
compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the 4th Geneva Conventions according to 
the independent mission and their report in the book, How Does Law Protect in War? In which 
reported on the legality of the operation being carried out: 
I: “The Isreali Government has stated it took the following steps to warn the civilian 
population of Gaza:” 
One leaflet drop stated the following before air attacks commenced: “To the residents of 
the Gaza Strip: the IDF will act against any movements and elements conducting terrorist 
activities against the residents of the State of Israel. The IDF will hit and destroy any building or 
site containing ammunition and weapons. As of the publication of this announcement, anyone 
having ammunition and/or weapons in his home is risking his life and must leave the place for 
the safety of his own life and that of his family. You have been warned94.” 
Customary International Law (CIL) requires that party in control of the area exercises 
article 57 (1) of Additional Protocol I which states “in the conduct of military operations, 
constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects95.” The 
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IDF was not in control of the areas where leaflets were dropped, even though before attack each 
party has the duty under CIL to “remove civilian persons and objects under its control from the 
vicinity of military targets96.”Because the areas where governed and protected by Hamas, it 
should have been taken upon them to remove their civilians from areas where they stored 
weapons, had underground rocket launching apparatuses, and where soldiers where located. 
However this was not complied with by Hamas because the presence of civilians drastically 
made it more difficult for the IDF to target just military objects with being guaranteed that 
civilian collateral would most likely occur while using heavy ordinance. The IDF also dropped 
leaflets to areas that were specifically going to be attacked including this one to the 
neighborhood of Rafah: 
“Because your houses are used by Hamas for military equipment smuggling and storing, 
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) will attack the areas between Sea Street and till the Egyptian 
border…All the residents of the following neighborhoods: Block O-al-Brara-al-Shu’ara-Keshta-
al-Salem neighborhood should evacuate their houses till beyond Sea Street. The evacuation 
enters into force from now till tomorrow at 8 AM. For the safety and for the safety of your 
children, apply this notice97.” 
 While these warning comply with IHL, it also gives militants a warning to leave the area 
in which the threat of attack had been announced by the IDF, giving the militants time to prepare 
for an assault or leave, in which the leaflets can have an opposite effect of driving Hamas 
regulars to areas where the civilian population was told to flee too. The IDF overlooked the 
possible consequences to their mission of striking at rocket crews in residential neighborhoods. 
The mission also identified that rocket launching crews from Hamas were moving so rapidly to 
avoid being targeted by drones or aircraft monitoring the area closely, that they did not make the 
civilian population aware of their presence, which would be difficult none the less, however this 
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renders the protection of the area as being a civilian object due to a mobile military object now 
being there. Due to the heavily populated urban areas of Gaza, IDF forces and Hamas militants 
were always amongst civilians wither knowingly or unknowingly, which isn’t a violation of 
international law per say, but parties should be aware when they are entering a habited zone.  
 One of the more effective warnings that were issued to Palestinian civilians announcing 
of an impending attacks were targeted phone calls. “The mission notes the credible account of 
Mr. Abu Askar of the telephone warning he received as a result of which he was able to evacuate 
up to 40 people from his and other houses. He received that call around 1:45 a.m. and Israeli 
forces destroyed his house with a missile strike seven minutes later98.” However there were 
instances where phone calls were made and no strike occurred or occurred later with no warning. 
One instance identified by the mission is the case of the AL-Bader Flour Mills Co. which 
received two separate messages in which no attack took place. Five days later in the early hours 
of the morning the factory was destroyed99. This was particularly rare and the phone calls were 
seen as a great success. Due to a total of 165,000 advanced targeted telephone warnings, 
thousands of lives were spared with little effort on behalf of the IDF100.  
 “From the information available to it, the mission found no evidence to suggest that 
Palestinian armed groups either directed civilians to an area where attacks were being launched 
or forced civilians to remain in the area101.” Concrete evidence of Hamas being caught red 
handed employing human shields has not been proven by any international commission. 
Although there were instances of the IDF capturing suspicious positioning of militants around 
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civilians when they knew the IDF was observing them, many international outlets did not seem 
convinced, especially the admittedly flawed Goldstone Report. Amnesty International concluded 
that both Hamas and the IDF, endangered civilians equally due to house to house fighting, where 
families would be trapped inside their homes during engagements between the warring parties.  
According to Richard Kemp, the former commander of British Forces in Afghanistan  who 
investigated and testified to the UN Human Rights Council on Operation Cast Lead said “In 
Gaza, according to residents there, Hamas fighters who previously wore black or khaki 
uniforms discarded them when Operation Cast Lead began, to blend in with the crowds and use 
them as human shields. We have seen all this before, in Lebanon, in Iraq and in Afghanistan102.” 
While it is a fact that Hamas did not distinguish themselves from the civilian population there is 
little credible evidence outside of the Israeli government backing up the IDF’s numerous claims 
that Hamas directly used human shields during Cast Lead.  
Another method used by the IDF to assist the civilians was through radio warnings and 
information. It informed residents of safe areas to go, in which case they stated to go to the city 
centers to avoid areas because ground forces were attacking from the outskirts of the urban areas. 
The fiercest fighting would take place in those areas. Radio announcements also indicated where 
civilians could go to receive food and humanitarian aid from the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA). Civilians would know that those corridors would be safe zones. Due 
to the IDF’s superior technology and means, their ability to warn civilians was their obligation 
along with it being required by IHL. Their domination of the airwaves and control of 
communications allowed targeted areas to be evacuated before a strike.  
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 “From the  first briefings before going in, it was clear that the army had changed its 
entire mindset. Instead of getting the usual precautions on not harming civilians, we were told 
about the need to make a very aggressive entry. We were told: ‘any sign of danger, open up with 
massive fire’. In previous training, we prepared for fighting against guerrilla forces, but this 
time they told us that we would be facing Hamas fighting in full military formation - something 
that, obviously, did not happen. Some of us were very uncomfortable with these orders others 
were pleased that finally the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] was taking off the kid gloves…103” 
 
Arik Dubnov, reconnaissance company of a reserve brigade of the Israeli army, 
  
 1,417 Palestinians were killed and 5,303 wounded during the 22 days of Operation Cast 
Lead, while the Israelis had 13 deaths, three civilians and ten IDF soldiers, during the 
offensive.104. It is debated as too how many Palestinians that were killed were combatants and 
noncombatants. It is obvious that more civilians were killed than militants during the conflict. In 
the eyes of the international community the efforts of the IDF in trying to avert civilian casualties 
was oppressed by the conduct of ground forces and the targeting  decisions made at the time 
based on quick intelligence. The strategy imposed by the IDF and the mindset that they instilled 
in soldiers before the ground maneuver commenced is of serious concern. There were human 
rights violations and a select few that can be constituted as war crimes. The IDF took it upon 
them to neutralize threats within the sixth most densely populated place on earth.   
There were some flaws within their warnings to a Palestinian population caught in the 
crossfire and terrified with few places to go that guaranteed safety. The mission notes that radio 
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broadcasts and some leaflets only stated to go to the city centers in which “most cases were 
lacking in specificity and clarity: people could not be certain that the warnings were directed at 
them in particular, since they were being issued as far as they could tell to almost everyone. 
Furthermore, in the circumstances created by the Israeli Armed Forces, people could not 
reasonably be expected to flee to what appeared to be even less safe places on the basis of such 
non-specific warnings105.” The mission was highly critical of such methods in which there were 
just general warnings but the majority of the leaflets did disclose the exact location for 
noncombatants to flee too.106 
 During the ground invasion on 3 January, the IDF used three brigades along with 
Merkava tanks to invade Gaza, attempting to secure grounds from where militants could 
continue their rocket fire into Israel. The mission was highly successful in neutralizing militants 
during intense ground combat in mostly urban areas. The destruction that the IDF left during the 
fighting, especially from artillery, tank fire, and white phosphorous were devastating and could 
be classified as overkill. During the duration of the ground operation a number of serious 
breaches of IHL occurred, some of which according to many NGO’s, including Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, could be classified as war crimes. The IDF was intent to 
do everything in its power to ensure that casualties from its ground forces would be as minimal 
as possible.  The IDF stated that the rules of engagement during the Gaza operation “state that a 
civilian objective loses its immunity if it is used by the enemy for a military activity107.”  This 
became problematic as “Hamas continued to launch attacks from densely populated areas and 
protected sites. In fact as IDF forces advanced into Gaza, Hamas began to rely even more heavily 
                                                          
105
 Id pg. 1053 para 356 
106
Supra note 99 From IDF report Operation Cast Lead: Humanitarian Aspects 
107
  Supra note 91.  
than before on rocket and mortar launches from the midst of urban centers. In addition to staging 
rocket attacks from civilian areas, Hamas conducted much of its fighting during the Gaza 
operation from bases within private residences and public facilities, which Hamas assumed the 
IDF would be reluctant to attack108.” Targeting is the number one issue as human life between 
Palestinian civilians and Israeli soldiers in weighed and decided on in the span of a few minutes, 
if not seconds. “Additional Protocol I allows the targeting of otherwise protected civilian 
structure “’by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military 
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage109.” Israeli commanders have to make a 
decision in the heat of the conflict that if a unit is taking heavy fire from an apartment complex 
that has civilians in it still, under IHL, that apartment complex renders it use as a civilian object 
and immediately becomes a military objective that if neutralize, will save Israeli soldiers in the 
field. It is his duty to his men and country to make the choice that will save Israeli civilian and 
soldiers. 
 Human Rights Watch reported that there had been seven separate instances where Israeli 
soldier fired upon and killed 11 Palestinian civilians whom where waving the white flag, this 
included five women and four children110. Another incident occurred when about 100 members 
from a family were hiding in a home when it was attacked by an airborne projectile killing 29111. 
Two soldiers did stand trial for forcing a boy to search bags for booby traps during a home 
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invasion, they served three month sentences in prison and were demoted112. A number of IDF 
soldiers were indicted on manslaughter charges but none were convicted. The IDF has had the 
luxury of being able to maneuver their way through criminal charges against their soldiers 
because one of their main policies is to ensure that their soldiers protected legally because “it 
could lessen the motivation of prospective soldiers to serve in combat units113.” “The 
commanders and soldiers who were sent to Gaza need to know they’re safe from various 
tribunals114.” Accountability is one of the IDF’s main principles which contradicts the actions of 
criminal suites being brought forward against soldiers after Cast Lead. The IDF’s protection of 
soldiers accused of war crimes drastically hurts their credibility in the international community 
and obviously does not own up to some isolated actions during Cast Lead that was against IHL. 
Some soldiers dodged justice which adds fuel to the fire of the argument against the IDF.  
 
VIII: Conclusion on the Assessment of the IDF during the Second Lebanon War and 
Operation Cast Lead 
“I don’t think any country would find it acceptable to have missiles raining down on the heads of 
its citizens. The first job of any nation-state is to protect its citizens. And so I can assure you that 
if…somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I’m 
going to do everything in my power to stop that. And I would expect Israel to do the same 
thing115.” 
                                                                                    Barack Obama 
 The overview of IDF compliance with IHL during their two most recent large scale 
conflicts offers a picture where arguments on both sides are valid and invalid. It seems as though 
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IHL is abstract and seems to fit the user based on the information they choose to disclose. It is 
difficult to get to the center of the story as you deal with two highly motivated sides in which 
academics and those in the international community are split. The assessment of the IDF during 
the Second Lebanon War yielded that the IDF responded to an armed attack with overwhelming 
power that was questionable in its use. However, at the same time once rockets were being fired 
indiscriminately at Israeli population centers it was justified under the laws of war, jus in belllo. 
A response to protect the people of Israel was warranted but the size of the response will be 
forever questioned under the laws of proportion. Israel left destruction in its trail after the 33 day 
conflict but a mission was accomplished. They set back Hezbollah years, showed a reason for 
future deterrence, and established a relative calm along the northern border for the past six and a 
half years. Ultimately the conclusion of the war and the rearming of Hezbollah to a level that has 
upgraded their capabilities and weapons, will lead to a cycle repeating itself where another 
conflict in the not so distant future is highly plausible. The IDF’s attempts to clear civilians away 
from the battlefield were unnoticed as the certain possibility of civilian damage was a given due 
to the strength of the response. It is difficult for any state to justify killing innocent bystanders 
who were imbedded unwillingly with armed militants but the fact remains that Israel acted in 
self-defense to an armed attack even though the IDF response was in major question in terms of 
the proportionality.  
 The Gaza War or better known as Operation Cast Lead, was a justified response to 
indiscriminate rocket fire raining down on civilian population centers in Southern Israel. “It is 
unreasonable to expect the military planners would have the capability to definitively determine 
the exact number of casualties or civilian property damage a military operation would cause116.” 
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Those critical of Israel’s response fail to identify that there is a fully democratic government that 
has an obligation to its citizens to protect their lives and livelihood which under the 
circumstances in the many years prior to a major military offensive, was legal. An enemy that 
hides amongst its people and aims to purposely kill women and children is not one that any 
government would take lightly in responding to. “In particular, how should one measure military 
advantage against human lives? How should one assess the worth of human lives on both sides 
of the conflict? Are the parties entitled to protect their own citizens or soldiers at the cost of 
endangering uninvolved enemy civilians, and if so, at what ratio117?” The answer to these 
questions are left up to the warring parties to decipher for themselves in the context of IHL. The 
conclusion remains that “the application of the principle of proportionality in military operations 
is ambiguous and very hard to verify118.” To this paper given the accusations and contexts that 
Israel complied with IHL and had full right to respond with armed force to Hezbollah and Hamas 
in order to protect its citizens from certain harm. 
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